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A

LETTER

TO A

MEMBER

OF

PARLIAMENT.

Concerning the present State of Affairs
at HOME and ABROAD.

By a true Lover of the People.

L O N D O N:

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LETTER

TO

MEMBER

OF THE

ROYAL SOCIETY





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M E M B E R O F P A R L I A M E N T,
&c.

S I R,

IT is very possible you may be under some Surprize, at receiving from me a Letter on the State of the Nation, who very lately, as well as on all other Occasions, refused to concur with many of your Constituents in framing Instructions for the Direction of your Conduct in the next Session of Parliament. There is you know a wide difference between instructing and informing, between enjoining you to follow other Mens Opinions, under the highest Penalty,

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nalty, that of forfeiting the esteem of your Country, and modestly laying before you the Sentiments of a private Freeholder, with which you are desired to concur, no farther than as what seems reasonable to him, appears also in the same Light to you. This is true *English* Liberty, Liberty of perswading by Argument, not by Force.

Though the Distinction I have made is certainly sufficient to justify me, in your Opinion, on the Subject of this Address; yet designing, as I do, to deal freely and candidly with you in all things, I will join to this Apology for now writing, my Reasons for not then instructing; to the end you may be convinced that I act in all things from Principle, not from any particular Humour, or Party-View, much less thro' any Venal Influence, an Imputation some Men, with what Justice God only knows, would bring upon the whole Nation.

There have been many Attempts made of late Years to confound our Notions, as to the Relation between us, and those we send to Parliament. Abundance of new Terms have been introduced, such as Deputies, Attornies, Agents, which are very far from expressing what we ought to conceive of a Member of Parliament, and which is very justly and clearly explained by the legal Term *Representative*. A Representative is
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one to whom I give a Power of judging for me in certain Matters for a certain Time; and this, I take it, is the Power vested in every Member of the House of Commons.

Those who are fond of having you called Deputies, either do not understand that Word, or else prevaricate in the Use they make of it. The Deputies from the *Dutch* Provinces are by no means to be compared with our Members of Parliament; for this plain and short Reason, that the Government of our Neighbours is a Democracy, whereas hitherto ours is not so. Amongst them, the Legislative Power and the Executive Power are both in the Hands of the People; but because they cannot manage it themselves, therefore they entrust certain Individuals to act in the Name, and by the Authority of the People, in such and such Districts. These are properly Deputies, mere Creatures, and absolute Dependants on the People, in Virtue of the Constitution.

As to Attornies and Agents, they are by no means equivalent to Members, because we appoint them spontaneously, invest them with what Powers we think fit, and divest them of those Powers when we think proper. They are indeed our Representatives in what they do; but then it is entirely in our Power to limit what they shall do. On these Accounts therefore, they differ essentially from

Members of the House of Commons, who though they are indebted for their Places to our Choice, yet owe the Powers they are invested with to the Constitution.

According to the Frame of our Government, whereby all Sorts of Political Rights amongst us are settled, the Executive Power is solely in the King, and the Legislative in Him, and his two Houses of Parliament. In him by Law is vested the Power of calling Parliaments, which he does by directing Writs to the Peers, who represent themselves, and by issuing his Writs to the Sheriffs of the respective Counties in the united Kingdoms, commanding them to return such Persons as legal Electors, in a legal Manner, chuse for their Representatives. This is the Right by which the Members of the House of Commons sit, and by which, those who chuse them give them that Right; nor is there any thing difficult to comprehend in the whole of this Transaction.

But with Respect to the new-claimed Right of Instructing, there are to me insuperable Difficulties in accounting for it, in such a Manner, as to make it consistent with our Constitution. The Reason of calling a Parliament is, because the King desires the Advice of his Lords, and the Concurrence of his People; so it is in the Writs, so it is in fact, and so it always was. Now, that the
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People should send Persons to represent them in the Assembly where the arduous Affairs of the Nation are to be debated and decided, is, as I said before, easily understood; but how they should instruct them, as to Matters which themselves cannot legally know any thing about, is what I am at a Loss to comprehend. If the Instructions given to our Members are binding, how are they our Representatives, since we, if we were present, would be free Agents; and, on the other hand, if our Instructions are not binding, to what Purpose do we instruct?

There is no Man living more attach'd to the Constitution, more tenacious of the Subjects Rights, or more a Friend to Liberty than I: But could I, as a Lover to the Constitution, enter into a Measure no way warranted thereby? Could I, with my Eyes open, pretend to claim that as a Right, which I saw to be no Right? or could I, as a Friend to Liberty, pretend to abridge the Freedom of my Representative, and take from him, as far as in my Power lay, a Capacity of acting according to the Dictates of his Conscience? No; Sir, I could not, and therefore I did not: I left you the Liberty I now exercise, and all I expect from you is, that you would speak and vote as freely in your Capacity as I write in mine.

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To me this new, this anti-constitutional Practice of instructing, seems a mere Juggle; the Member first transmits his Notions to his Creatures, and then they, under the Name of his Constituents, instruct him, as he first instructed them. These, Sir, are Artifices of a dangerous Nature, and may for ought I know, prove destructive of our Constitution. The Law is the great Security we have for our Lives, our Liberties, and Properties, and he who desires me to act against, or without Law, on any Occasion, desires me to give away, as far as in me lies, that great Security I mention.

As I have now set down succinctly, and sincerely, Motives which hindered me from acting, as many of your Constituents did, in the Business of instructing, I will now as fairly, and freely tell you, why at this Time I address you in this publick Manner, and that too, on the very same Subjects to which their Instructions relate. I know you gave a good Reception, though not bound to it, to them; Yet I know not what Reception you will afford this Letter from me; but I know it is my Business to deserve a good one.

It is impossible for a Man, who makes any Pretences to Religion, Virtue, or Honesty, not to have a deep Concern for the Interest of his Country, and it is equally impossible

possible for him to have this Concern, and yet continue silent, where he has a Right, and a Power, of delivering his Sentiments, and the Interest of his Country is visibly at stake. A warm Sense of the former, and a sincere Belief of the latter, induced me to set Pen to Paper: I think, Sir, that the Constitution at home, the Glory, the Trade of the Nation abroad, are at present in some Danger; and therefore, Sir, I think I have the same Right to address myself to you, that a Member of an Insurance-Office has, to call to a Fire-man, when he has Reason to imagine that his House may be burnt.

But I am very sensible that some have affected to represent both Church and State in danger, when there was not the least Cause. To shew you, Sir, I am not of this Number, I will tell you bluntly what those things are, which have occasioned my Fears. I am apprehensive there are some Men amongst us, who under Pretence of promoting a *Place-Bill*, aim at altering, if not subverting the Constitution; and who, with an apparent Zeal for carrying on the present War, harbour in their Hearts a secret Intention of thwarting all those Measures, by which only it can successfully be pursued. These are Apprehensions I have long coolly considered, and am confident they are not groundless. But that I might do all that a private Man could

could do towards preventing those Mischiefs I thought I foresaw: I drew up the Reasons which inclined me to this Opinion, and present them first to you, as a Member of Parliament, and my Representative, and next to the Publick. Now, let their Fate be what it will, let them be thought forcible or frivolous, worthy of Scorn, or worthy of Notice, I am easy, I have done my Duty!

My Reasons are these:

We are told by some, who think themselves great Politicians, that though we, the People of *Great Britain*, are in no danger from the Prerogative, that is, the legal Power of the Crown, yet are we in imminent Peril from its Ministerial Influence. The Revolution it seems, which took away the Sting of the former, created the latter; so that getting rid of one Mischief, we gave birth to another, and to be quit of this, the sole Remedy they say is a *Place-Bill*. I will not take upon me to decide so knotty a Question as this, between the Crown and the People. In my private Opinion, I do not think we are in any Danger from the Power of the Crown, take that Phrase in what Sense you will: In this Case however I shall content myself with proving, that if there really was such a Danger, a *Place-Bill* is by
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no Means calculated to avert it, though it will certainly bring upon us a great many real Evils, much worse than that they would introduce it to avoid, though this perhaps subsists only in their Imaginations.

If this Bill ever passes into a Law, though the Pretence is to bridle the Regal Power, yet it's first Operation must be upon the Subject; for the enacting Clause will disable not the King from giving Places, but the People from chusing such as he has given Places to. If the Crown had any Power of obtruding Place-Men on the legal Electors, it would be but just to take away this Power; but since the People are already at Liberty, either to elect, or let it alone, it is certainly a little strange, that they should be made to demand an Abridgment of this Power, since this implies a gross Absurdity, *viz.* that Liberty may be increased, by being diminished. We know, with all the Certainty that an historical Truth can be known, that the *Danish* Nobility were compelled by the People to give up all their Privileges to the Crown; we ought therefore to be cautious of Practices of this Nature, because we ought to conceive the Liberties of the *British* Nation inviolable even by themselves.

It would have had an odd Appearance, Sir, had you been told in your Instructions, that your Constituents were conscious of

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having too much Freedom, and therefore in pure Humility of Heart, and prudent Principles of political Self-denial, intreated you to give your Vote for the Abridgment of their Liberty, in a certain Instance, where they were conscious they could not make a right Use of it. This, I say, would have look'd somewhat strangely, and yet read your Instructions over again, you will find this to be the Sense of them, in what Words soever it may be expressed. Thus it seems a free People may be brought to cast away their Freedom, under Pretence of enlarging or securing it. Alas! Alas! what Security can we have, when we ourselves are afraid of being free?

But there is a Spirit of Corruption abroad, and this makes such a Measure necessary. Strange, that a Spirit of Corruption should do more than the Spirit of God, and change the very Essence of Things, make Restraint Freedom, and Freedom Restraint! Bills of Attainder have been always looked upon with some Degree of Horror; and yet, such at present is the Infatuation of the People, that they call for an Act to attain themselves; for no Law of this Nature can pass, without declaring the whole Nation to be corrupted, which is another Absurdity; for no corrupt Nation would ever declare itself so. But we must go all Lengths to serve the Purposes of a
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Party, we must tye our own Hands, to have them more at Liberty, and in order to become free, we must declare ourselves unworthy of Freedom. O, that these were Flights of Fancy, mere Figures of Rhetorick, and not a modest Representation of our Country's Nakedness!

To make this Proceeding still the more absurd, there is no Evidence offered to support this Bill. The Nation pleads guilty to the blackest of all Charges, that of being universally venal, and no wonder when the People are brought to prefer this Charge against themselves. But as this is no Law hitherto, I may enquire who brings this Charge, and on this Enquiry I find that it is a Set of Men, who on all legal Divisions have been found the Minority. Upon what Testimony then do they proceed? Do they know this to be a Fact from any thing that falls under their immediate Notice? Far from it, they assert themselves free from Corruption, in the same Breath they condemn the Nation of it. Do the Majority own it? No, they deny it in the most solemn Manner: On a strict Inquisition therefore, it is as clear as such a thing can be, that the very Ground of this Complaint is false, and that this Law, if ever it becomes one, will carry a Lye in its Preamble, as well

as a judicial Sentence of Ignominy on the *British* People.

From this View of the intended Remedy, I think it may be concluded, that it is more likely to become a Poison, and therefore in common Prudence, we ought not to be over hasty in taking it down. We know very well, that there have been Reigns, wherein the Rights we now enjoy were not only controverted but denied. There is no need therefore of Hurry in pruning away such Branches of Freedom as we think useless; it is not impossible that our Posterity may incline to wish for those Privileges which we want to cut off; and if they should, they will certainly find it not so easy to regain, as we may to rescind. Men who pretend to have such Esteem for the Constitution, as those do who are eager for this Bill, should methinks be more tender of meddling with it; and while they continually exaggerate their Attention to Consequences, it would be but decent to pay a greater Respect to their Offspring than this Project does, since, for ought I have heard, it is to be of a perpetual, and not of a temporary Nature; so that either they believe themselves infallible, or else care not what their Children suffer through their obstinate Mistakes.

Thus you have my first Objection to the Bill, *viz.* that it is needless and unnatural
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in it's full Extent; neither ought you to wonder if I am a little heated, since I am actually under as great a Concern, lest my Country should suffer from this new devised Specifick, as your Friends pretend to be, lest their Strength and Vitals should be consumed by what they call Corruption. If, after weighing what I have said, you think me in the right, my Warmth will stand in no need of Pardon; but if you should think me in the wrong, let the Sense of your own Resentment excuse it. As there can be no true Love without Jealousy, so there can be no real Patriotism without a quick Sensation of our Country's Injuries: or, which is the same Thing, of whatever we esteem such. A necessary Caution this; and now let me proceed to my Second Objection.

As this Exclusion Scheme of our new Patriots does not appear to be deeply founded in Reason, so nothing can be clearer, than that it is directly contrary to Experience. Our Fore-fathers had amongst them wise and zealous Patriots (witness their framing *Magna Charta*, and obliging the Clergy to read it after Divine Service) these Patriots understood our Constitution, and were so firmly attached to it, that they frequently ventured their Lives and Fortunes for it's Sake; yet, so far were they from thinking of any Expedient like this, that, as I shall presently shew,

shew, they took a Method directly contrary, and fought to preserve the People's Liberties, by providing that the King's Place-Men, should be such as had Seats in Parliament.

The Ground they went upon was this, they supposed, that such as were possessed of Property, would always have Regard to Property? and therefore in the great Struggle under King *Henry III*, the main Point in debate was, whether the King should name his chief Officers, or whether they should be named to him by Parliament. This was also endeavoured at in all succeeding Disputes, such as those in the Reigns of *Edw. II*, and *Rich. II*, which is a Proof that our Forefathers, for a long Course of Years, were of the same Opinion, and thought it extremely dangerous to the People, that there should be so much as a Possibility of the King's bringing Strangers and Men without Property into Places. In the Reign of *Henry VIII*, when the Commons took up Arms in the Maintenance of what in those Days was stiled Liberty, they, amongst other Articles of Complaint, exhibited this, that the King had about him many mean Counsellors, Persons of low Birth, and who had little Interest in their Country. To this the King penned an Answer with his own Hand, wherein he clearly and distinctly refuted the Charge, shewed that it was rather the Scandal

dal of his Father's Reign than of his own ; and thereby made it appear that in this Point his Judgment went along with the Commons. Nay, so late as in the Time of *Charles I*, the same Demand was set up, and in one of the Nineteen Propositions sent to the King at *York* ; so that we have full Evidence that this was the constant Opinion of our wisest Statesmen, and most steady Patriots for several hundred Years ; and though no Age is infallible, yet it seems to favour of Presumption, when we assert, that so many great Men should want common Sense for so long a Tract of Time.

Neither is it any Answer to what has been alledged, that there were fewer Place-Men in those Days than now, and that there is no Intent to exclude by this Bill any of the great Officers of State ; because the Reason upon which these Patriots went extended to all Place-Men, and is diametrically opposite to the Reason of this Bill. They argued that the Servants of the State were the Servants of the King and People, and that therefore they should be such as were some way connected with the People, as well as dependant on the Prince. Now this is and must be the Case of all Place-Men, and therefore the Reasoning of our Fore-fathers affects them all, and we act directly against their Sentiments, when we
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make it a Point to exclude these Men from Seats in Parliament, under a Notion of securing thereby the Liberty of the Nation, and the Independency of the House of Commons.

That trite Pretence, that we are more corrupt than our Ancestors, and that, consequently, some necessary Changes must be made, to accommodate our Government to the Ends it is to answer, does by no Means account for the Change attempted in this particular. If, as a Nation, we are more corrupt, then I do not see why we should suppose such as set up for Patriots now to be either wiser, or better, than the Patriots of former Times; and if they are not, why should we not rather adhere to the old Plan sketch'd out to us by the same Hands, whereby our Constitution was traced, which in Words at least, even our modern Patriots confess to be excellent. They who built the whole House may be presumed to have judged best of all it's Apartments: And, I think, it is no ill Wish, that our modern State Architects may not, by their Experiments, bring an old House upon their Heads, and ours; because, if they do, it is ten to one it may beat out many a Man's Brains.

I am well enough aware of another Answer, that may be thought totally to enervate the Force of this Objection, and to show

show you that I have considered it; and that I neither seek to deceive myself, nor you, I will give it all it's Force. It may be said, that Place-Men would not be dangerous in Parliament, if they were chosen by the People. That this was the Sense of our Ancestors, and that, if we will abide by it, we must take the whole of what they proposed. But observe, Sir, that as Experience justifies one Part of this Proposition, so it overturns the other. We are to follow our Ancestors in what is right, and we are to leave them where they were visibly in the wrong. This is the true Use of Experience; for to follow old Methods blindly, is to fall under the Tyranny of Custom.

The chusing the great Officers of the Kingdom, in Parliament, or by the People, had a very fair Appearance, and so we need not wonder, that it generally found Friends. But when it came to be put in Execution, it has been everlastingly found impracticable; such Officers assuming to themselves a Power, equally inconvenient to King and People. An Instance will make this familiar: Sheriffs were eligible by the Freeholders in every County, by the Common Law; so they continued all the Time of the Saxons, but by Degrees, such Inconveniencies were found, in this Manner of constituting such Officers, that by a Statute in the 9th of

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Edw. II. commonly called *The Statute of Sheriffs*, it is enacted, *That the Sheriffs shall be assign'd by the Chancellor, Treasurer, Barons of the Exchequer, &c.* So that we see, our Ancestors were wise enough to secure their Liberties, by giving up such Powers, as were dangerous to them, when carried into Execution.

Those who, in the Days of *Charles I.* were for reviving this Claim, in all Probability, knew well enough the Inconveniences attending it; but their View was to get the Government into their Hands, which they were resolved to alter. Mr *Hampden's* first Scheme was to be Governor to the Prince, in which, if he had succeeded, this Alteration, no doubt was to have been promoted by the Power of the Crown; but failing in that, he had Recourse to the Parliament, and finding there a Number of Persons of the same Spirit, who were desirous of trying their Skill, as Legislators: this was among the Number of their Projects. That, in the main, they might intend the People well, is what I will not dispute; but this I am sure of, that if any Minister, of the most upright Intentions in the World, endeavoured any such Alterations, even by Authority of Parliament, he would go near to be thought a Traitor, if he did not suffer as such. It must therefore be a Maxim with all such as design

design to subvert this Constitution, that they set up for Patriots.

I would not be thought to insinuate any kind of Slander ; because I despise, and abhor it. But these general Cautions are necessary, as appears from the Conduct of those Gentlemen, who argue on the Side of the Bill. They tell you, that Duty, Loyalty, and Affection to our Prince, are Terms frequently mis-applied, and that therefore, we ought to be upon our guard, lest artful Men should by a Train of fine Words, lead us to fulfil their foul Purposes. Thus far I agree with them ; and all I here offer, is with the very same View, to prevent Men from promoting bad Things, out of Respect to good Words. The Rule is general, that the Corruption of the best Things produces the worst ; and I am ready to allow, that nothing is more certain, than that Excess of Loyalty begets a Proneness to Slavery ; except that too fierce a Zeal for Liberty hath a natural Tendency to produce Confusion.

I have now done with my Second Objection, wherein I have laboured to make it plain, that our modern Patriots may possibly be mistaken. I come now to my last Objection, which, in few Words, is this ; that we may possibly be mistaken in our modern Patriots ; and my Reason is, because I see this Bill in quite another Light than

you do. You take it for a well-intended Scheme, a strong Barrier to Liberty, and a Project entirely calculated for the Profit of the People; whereas, if I see right, it is an artificial Blind, set up to screen secret Purposes, a Scheme dangerous to the People, if not destructive to Freedom; and which, in the End, will be found to give such a vast Accession of Power to the Crown, as will leave us no Hopes, but in the personal Virtues of the Prince who wears it; which, if his present Majesty were immortal, might appear a feeble Objection; but is, otherwise, the strongest that can be made.

There is certainly nothing more apparent in our Political System, than that the Health of our Government consists in the Union of it's several Branches. A three-fold Cord owes it's Strength to it's being twisted, and if we intend to break it, separating does the Business. While the King of *Great Britain* and his two Houses of Parliament are on good Terms amongst themselves, we have Peace at Home, and Respect abroad; but when once any Differences arise among them, civil Dissensions quickly induce foreign Contempt, and exactly in the same Proportion that we disturb and distress each other, we are slighted and disregarded by our Neighbours. When our Kings, *John*, *Edward II*, *Richard II*, aimed at making themselves

themselves absolute, our Country was a Field of Blood, and our Nation made no Figure in *Europe*. It was the same Case when the Barons struggled with King *Henry III*, and when Factions set up now a Prince of the House of *Lancaster*, and then a King of the House of *York*. But under the Reigns of *Edward III*, and Queen *Elizabeth*, when the Parliament concurred with the Crown, the People confided in it too; whence it comes to pass that these appear the brightest Times in Story.

In short, whenever we have suffered, it has been either from weak Princes conceiving that themselves and their Families might be aggrandized at the Expence of the People, or from the Peoples being taught to apprehend that whatever lessened the Power of the Crown must contribute to their Happiness. Instances of both might be given from the *English* History, but the Point is so universally agreed on, that I think they would be needless. In respect to Felicity, the Relation between a Prince and his Subjects, is the same as between a Master of a House and his Family, whatever benefits one can never injure the other; and a want of Attention to this Maxim must sooner or later destroy both.

Yet this Place-Bill, whenever it passes into a Law, will establish both a nominal and a
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real Difference between the Interests of the King and of his People. It will enact that such as serve one shall not be capable of serving the other, and this at the same Time that it is confessed that to serve either well we must serve both. By this Bill such as are in the Service of the Crown will be marked out as Enemies to their Country, at least to their Countrymen and Fellow-subjects; for if they were Friends, why should they be excluded from representing them, a Right allowed to all Lay-Subjects by the Common Law, except such as were excommunicated or outlawed? Hitherto when such a Distinction as this had subsisted a while, Men saw their Errors, and, in Respect to their Country, united again. But this Law will prove a Wall of Division which private Men can never throw down; it will establish a perpetual Distinction, and when it is passed we may date from thence as the *Æra* of Dissension.

How monstrous a thing must it appear to any human and rational Person, to hear of a Law establishing an unnatural Distinction. It has been declared over and over, that the intrusting the Crown with the executive Power, is for the Use and Benefit of the People. Can any thing then be plainer, than that such as the Crown employs in the executive Part of the Government, are in reality Servants
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to the People. Are they not taken from amongst the People? Are they not provided for by the People? How strange a Thing then to cut them off from the People, for that which, in Reason, ought more closely to unite them? Perhaps it will be said they are already divided. Yet this never can be proved; if it was so, it would be a great Misfortune; and to remedy this must we enact they shall never come together again?

Some People are apt to fancy, that there is a visible Inconsistency between a Person's receiving a Trust from the People and a Salary from the Crown, whereas there is nothing more agreeable to our Constitution. Is not the Money of the Crown, the Money of the Publick? Are not all publick Officers, Servants of the Publick? Where then is the Inconsistency of a Man's enjoying a Post of Profit, with a Post of Honour? Did not Members of Parliament anciently receive Wages for their Service in Parliament? And is not their receiving Salaries in Right of their Places the same thing in other Words, while those Places are bestowed by a King in the Interest of his People? Or do our dutiful Patriots think the publick Money the worse, because it passes through the Hands of the King? If indeed Patriotism was so prevailing, as that all Men would serve their Country in every Capacity for nought, then giving
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Places to Parliament-Men would be a Hardship, because it would be imposing double Offices on the same Men. But while Things are as they are, sure it is a Mark of publick Spirit in the Prince to prefer such as his People favour.

Besides, being conversant in Business is a mighty Advantage to a Senator. A Man absolutely unacquainted with publick Affairs, I mean unacquainted with the Management of them, will be but badly qualified to judge of the Conduct of those who do manage them, let him be ever so conversant with Books, or endowed by Nature with ever so great Abilities. Such a secluding of Senators from other publick Offices is not to be justified, either from the ancient Histories of *Greece* and *Rome*, or from the modern ones of *Venice* or *Genoa*. I confess it is not the Invention of our Patriots, it came originally from *Cromwell* and his Independents, who made use of this, very Artifice to destroy both King and Parliament, and to sacrifice the Interests of the Publick to the Views of a Handful of private Men.

The great End said to be proposed by the Law, is to heighten the Lustre of Parliament; but this, like the rest, is a mere Pretence; since whoever will consider the Thing with Patience, and without Prejudice, must perceive, that nothing can be
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more destructive than this Scheme to the Authority of Parliament. Hitherto a Seat in Parliament was judged the most reasonable Road to Preferment, and justly, for when a Man has served his Country at his own Expence, he merits a Reward; but if this Law should once take place, there will be an End of these Hopes, and such as are best qualified will be least inclined to serve their Country in Parliament. At present, this Apprehension may be ridiculed; but if ever we are so unhappy, as to judge of this Case by Experience, I dare pawn my Life, it will not be found a Mistake.

On the other hand, all such as are in Places, will now be more than ever dependent on the Crown, and it's Ministers; because they will then have no other Hopes, but from them. This Law will create to them a separate Interest, and point out to them separate Views. Instead of that Love and Veneration, which they now have for Parliaments, because they have the same Relation to them with other People, they will for the future behold them with Apprehension and Dislike; whence there must necessarily flow continual Jealousies, and endless Disturbances; for both, no doubt, will be able to form strong Parties, and neither will ever want plausible Pretences. It is without Question a disagreeable Office I have taken
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upon me ; but since I have taken it, I must perform it, even though these Representations should not be altogether void of Offence.

In the Number of odd Things this Law, when it shall be one, must bring to pass, this will not be the least ; that the People, at one and the same Time, shall declare their highest Respect for a certain Set of Men, and yet punish them, though innocent, with the greatest Severity. For can there be a greater Mark of Confidence, than chusing them their Representatives ; and can there well be a greater Punishment, than to disable a Man well qualified from serving his King and Country in an active State. How much Pride was the House of Commons wont to take, in returning thanks to their own Members, for Services done by them to the Nation, in other Capacities ! What must we therefore think of a Law, which renders this impossible for the future ? Can we believe that it will add to the Glory, or to the Authority of that Assembly ? We must have a strong Faith, or a very weak Eye-sight if we do.

From what has been said, I think, it appears past doubt, that such a Law as is now contended for, would create everlasting Jealousies between the Legislative and Executive Powers, and consequently give birth to a continual Opposition. The Members of the
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House of Commons are now very numerous, and if very few, who have Places, were allowed to sit there, some amongst them might be tempted to revenge this Distinction, by taking every Occasion to vex those, who were in Possession of them; and such a Proceeding as this would naturally excite Heart-burnings and Uneasinesses, among such as were in continual Danger; not from their Actions, but from the Spheres in which they were obliged to act.

We know, that as soon as the self-denying Ordinance took place in the long Parliament, which began about an hundred Years ago, and which we are obliged to mention, because it is the only Parallel to the Case before us, these Mischiefs actually did happen, these Disputes sprang up; but the Struggle was of no long Continuance, the Executive Power was, as it always will be, too strong for the Legislative, when weakened and impaired by such Laws; and so Force became Authority. Those were miserable Times for the People in general, and no very good ones for those, who, by such Arts, acquired Posts in a distracted State, to which they never could have risen in a well-governed Republick: and yet, sad as those Times were, some Men seem to wish them here again, if their Practices be any Comment on their Intentions. It depends wholly on the Virtue and Penetration

tration of the Majority of our Representatives, whether they shall, or shall not, be disappointed in their Expectations, and whether we shall suffer as deeply as our Ancestors, from the Craft and Cant of pretended Patriots.

Our present Condition, could we be content with it, is that alone whereby we are protected from all Apprehensions of this Sort. While Ministers of State, while the Officers of the Crown, while those who command our Armies, are in the same State with other Citizens, have the same Interest, and are capable of the same Honours; we have no just Reason to fear they will sacrifice so many, and so great Advantages, to gratify the Will of one Man. But, if, in a sudden Fit of Jealousy, we should treat them, as is by this Law proposed, like Persons already convicted, there is no knowing what they might do; but we may very easily know, that under Colour of avoiding, we had done our utmost to pull down the Mischief, of which we are most afraid, and to bring that about, which otherwise could never have happened.

It may be alledged, that, according to this Manner of arguing, all our modern Patriots are mistaken to a Man, and know not what they are about, which their known Wisdom and Prudence, and above all their boasted
Dexterity

Dexterity in the Management of the best conducted Opposition the World ever saw, [I use the Phrase of the late Viscount B——] will not allow us to believe. But to this I answer, that as great Men as they have been mistaken. *Pym, Hampden, and Hollis*, were mistaken; one saw his Mistake upon his Death-bed, another died mistaken, and the third lived to make amends for his Mistake. All Men are fallible, Patriots as well as Ministers of State; neither is there any Sort of Men, that I know of, so liable to be mistaken, as those who are governed by their Passions and Prejudices, which is visibly enough their Case. Let them look to that.

Besides, if they are such great Politicians, it is very possible they may not be mistaken; they may look upon the Bill in the same Light that I do, and promote it for all that; they will not be the first Statesmen who have pretended one Thing, and in reality intended another: And, if I might speak freely, I persuade myself, it would be no hard Matter to guess at the true Design of pushing this Bill. When I say this, I do not mean the true Design of the whole Party, but of those who manage and lead the Party; or rather, who drive them like Sheep to Market, in order to make the most of their Fleeces, and Skins. Some, who suffer not a Session of Parliament to pass, without
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mouthings at the *Civil List*, promised to have procured a greater, provided they might be Ministers instead of Patriots. Who knows what's in the Wind now?

A certain Statesman, in the Reign of King *Charles II*, voted for the *Bill of Exclusion* in the House of Lords, and lost his Place: A little after, he went to the Duke of *York's* Court, and demanded an Audience, which was granted. Our great Master of his Art undertook to convince his Royal Highness, that in giving his Voice to exclude him from the Throne, he did him Service. He reasoned thus; The King, *said he*, is inclined to go into any thing that Faction may desire, except an *Act of Exclusion*; it is necessary therefore to keep them up to this Demand, to prevent your coming to the Crown under a Multitude of Restrictions, to which your Brother would agree. This was a shrewed Turn, and it served his Purpose who used it; the Duke believed him, and he passed immediately from the Character of a most notorious Malecontent, into that of a Minister of the Cabinet.

Some moderate and sensible People, who, generally speaking, know what they say, pretend to tell us with Respect to this *Place-Bill*; that when it shall have answered it's Purpose [of turning the present Patriots into Ministers] it will then be repealed, or at least

least greatly softened. This they speak of as an allowable Expedient, justified by the Conduct of former Oppositions ; and indeed it must be owned, that our Constitution has suffered more from the Eagerness of Oppositions, and the Whims put by them into the Heads of the People, than from any other Cause. Mr *Montague*, afterwards Lord *Halifax*, was, at the Time it took place, as much decry'd for the *Recoynage*, as another Minister for the *Excise*. A Sea Officer's turning Pirate after Lord *Somers* had sealed his Commission was made use of to destroy that great Minister ; and every body knows, that the Cry of the *Church* being in Danger, forced out the great and good Earl of *Godolphin*, and brought not only us, but the greatest Part of *Europe*, into a Situation so bad, that we have not recovered from it to this very Day.

But, for Heaven's Sake, Sir, Let us have no more of these Experiments ! If once in twenty Years the discontented undermine, or blow up, a Part of our Constitution, in order to dislodge the then Ministry, we shall in Time, aye, and in a short Time too, have no Constitution at all. Such Practices may indeed shew the Skill of these State-Engineers, who, by using their Arts among our Enemies, might do us excellent Service ; but to treat the Government at home every Session

sion of Parliament, as Boys do Cocks on *Sbrove-Tuesday*, for their own Emolument, and the Diversion of the Mob, is what will never go down with the soberer Part of Mankind, such as we ought to hope will always make the Majority of the Nation.

Add to this, the dreadful Prospect we must have, if such Persons should ever carry their Point, and force themselves into Power. In such a Case, the Crown must necessarily distrust them, and the Voice of the People, being a Support never long to be relied on, these Statesmen must have Recourse to lifting a Party, sufficient to maintain them in Spight of Distrust on one Side, and of a just Aversion, when the People recover their Wits, and discover what Tools they have been made, on the other. Such was the Case of the motley Ministries King *William* was compell'd to make use of; such was the Case of the Tory Ministry, in the last four Years of the *Queen*; and such was the Case of another Ministry I could name, if it was proper. Our present Patriots are certainly great Men; but great as they are, they cannot alter the Nature of Things; they can interpose Nothing between Causes and Events; what has been, will be, in Spight of their Arts; and therefore, I lay it down, as a Thing certain, that
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if ever they do get into Power, this will be the Consequence.

Such, Sir, are the Motives which lead me to look upon the Place-Bill as an Engine of Faction brought to play upon the Constitution, in order to force the present Ministry to surrender. It is not personal Attachment to them; it is not the Force of Corruption, it is not any private or secret View whatever, that hath engaged me in the Detection of this Measure; but it is the Love of my Country, and Affection for the People, and a deep Concern for our Posterity. Alas, Sir, what have the Majority, what have ninety-nine in a Hundred of this Nation to do with who is in Power, or who is out? It is not so much out of Respect to the Crown, as out of Regard to their own Ease and Benefit, that the People have left the executive Part of the Government to the King; reserving to themselves that Power which they are best able to manage, of accusing, by their Representatives, such Ministers as, by abusing their Power, render the Government grievous to the People; and this Prerogative of accusing (for that is as much the Peoples Prerogative, as pardoning is the Crown's) hath received an additional Force, since the Revolution, by the legal Concession of the Crown, that no Pardon

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shall avail or be pleadable against an Impeachment.

How ample, how permanent, would the Happiness of this Nation be, if our Inclinations bore but any Proportion to our Constitution. If the King would be content with his Power, the Lords with their Jurisdiction, and the Commons with their Privileges; but so it is, that some or other of these are always for encroaching. We have formerly had ambitious Kings; arrogant, oppressive, and rebellious Lords; and in the Days of our immediate Ancestors, restless, unruly, and distracted Commons. All these, whenever they carried their Point, became Tyrants; but the worst of all Tyrannies was the last. Yet in spite of Reason, in spite of Experience, in spite of the Dangers which threaten us from abroad, too many of us are ready at the Beck of a few designing Men to begin the same Game again, and to set up the Place-Bill in 1741, as the pretended Patriots did the perpetuating Bill in 1641; for there is no governing Mobs without Idols. Here let me leave this unpleasing Subject, and pass to that of the War, once the Object of the Peoples Wishes, and now, as your Friends say, of their Resentment.

It is universally agreed, that the Conduct of foreign Affairs is by much the most difficult Part of a Minister's Employment, and
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therefore on this Side all Ministries, amongst us especially, are first attacked. To say the Truth, it is simply impossible for any Minister, how wise or upright soever, to manage Things so as to content a whole Nation in this Respect; neither is it his Business. He is not to consult Popularity, but the true Interest of the People; an ill-grounded Impeachment, in the Eyes of Posterity, does a Man more Honour than the Voice of publick Applause, gained by a weak Concurrence with common Opinions. In speaking of foreign Affairs, the Enemies of a Minister have vast Advantages, whereas his Friends, nay, and himself have insuperable Difficulties to struggle with. He who speaks or writes against him, thinks himself at Liberty to suggest whatever may serve his Purpose, tho' he knows it to be false. A Minister, or the Friends of a Minister, dare not, for the Nation's Sake, assert the contrary of these Charges, though they know the contrary to be true.

It is with the foreign Affairs as with Natural Philosophy, one System is admirable till another appears; and in asserting either, Men do not so much follow the Light of Reason, as the Impetus of their own Passions. Probable Things may be said on all Sides; and, which is strictly true, though it

may seem a little strange, that System is commonly most plausible which is at the bottom least practicable; and therefore Ministers are commonly run down for preferring Substance to Show. We need only run over in our Minds the several Charges brought against Ministers since the Restauration, to be convinced of this, and consequently to render us cautious in deciding.

The Earl of *Clarendon* was ruined under Pretence of his having sold *Dunkirk*, promoting the *Portugal* Match, and being the great Instrument in the *Dutch* War: His Answer to these Charges was burnt, to prevent the Trouble of replying; and it has since appeared, that he opposed the Sale of *Dunkirk*, that he did not propose the Match with *Portugal*, and that he was not particularly concerned in pushing the King on a *Dutch* War. In the same Reign the Earl of *Danby*, afterwards Duke of *Leeds*, and a great Instrument in the Revolution, was, through *French* Influence, accused of being in the *French* Interest; and if he had not been a Man of very great Parts, had in all Probability suffered for promoting what in fact he laboured all he could to prevent. In the Reign of King *William*, every body knows that Impeachments were the Weapons rather of private Revenge, than of just and

and publick Resentment. All the Histories we have of those Times agree in representing these Things in this Light; nor is there any Man who questions that the violent Proceedings against the Earl of *Hallifax*, Lord *Somers*, and the rest of the Ministers at the Close of King *William's* Reign, was the mere Effect of Party Rage, and the View some Men had of getting into Power. This appeared most plainly in the Treaty of *Utrecht*, negotiated by the great Promoters of those Impeachments, on the Plan of that very Treaty on Account of which these Lords were impeached.

Whoever considers these Matters, coolly and with Attention, must discover that, with a general Knowledge of the Affairs of *Europe*, and a particular Acquaintance with our publick Transactions, it is no difficult Matter for a Man of a malicious Wit to frame such a Charge against a Minister, with Respect to foreign Affairs, as shall be sufficient to raise a Clamour against him; especially if there be, as there always will be in *Britain*, a Party previously prejudiced against him, and desirous of wresting the Power out of his Hands. There is therefore no concluding rationally, from what is called common Fame, in Affairs of this Nature; for as the most innocent Man may be accused,

cused, so a general Accusation ought to affect no Minister, till it be supported by Proofs, that is, by legal Proofs in such a Way of Examination as is warranted by our Constitution. All other Charges are vague and impertinent; and, as on the one Hand, they may contain just Matter of Impeachment; so, on the other, they may also be perfect Chimæras, mere Inventions of envious Men, who to console themselves in a low Estate, would willingly have a Hand in pulling down others.

When Things were at a Crisis between us and *Spain*, that Measure was entered upon which has been since so violently decried, I mean the Convention. Yet whoever will have the Patience to consider it, with that Attention which is necessary to judge of it, must see that it has done us much Good and no Hurt. There was a Necessity of convincing all *Europe*, that we entered into the War on just Grounds, and that we did not enter upon it till we had no other Means of doing ourselves Justice. Our saying this would have signified nothing; Parties are seldom believed in their own Cause, but in this Case we make use of the Testimony of our Enemies, of all others the best Kind of Evidence. The Convention shows, that in the Judgment of *Spain* herself,

herself, we were grievously injured ; the Convention shews, that for the Sake of preserving the Peace of *Europe*, we were willing to be content with a small Reparation, provided we had full Security for the Time to come: the Convention shews that the present War was unavoidable on our Side, nor do I know how, without the Convention, these Things could otherwise have been shown.

Those who made that *Convention*, knew well, that however just our Quarrel was with *Spain*, yet when we were actually engaged in a War; many, or rather most, of the Powers of *Europe* would be alarmed at the Progress of our Arms, and incline to think it their Interest, to have Peace restored on Terms not fit for us to accept; whereas now, the Justice of our Quarrel, and the Nature of that Satisfaction which must be given us, before we sheathe our Swords, is so well known to the World, that there can be no Disputes about it; and after having taken these Precautions, to prevent any Aspersions on the Justice of the Nation, it appears clearly, the Administration will admit of no Disputes; but persist in refusing all Proposals, short of that Plan prescribed by the two Houses.

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The Instructions given to Admiral *Vernon*, and in Consequence of which he has acted vigorously in the *West-Indies*, were wisely calculated, to try whether a gentle Chastisement would not bring the *Spaniards* to their Wits, or oblige their politick Friends to advise them better. But while the Effects of these Proceedings were expected, other Precautions were not neglected. A Fleet was kept in the *Mediterranean*, to protect our Possessions, to distress the Enemy's Trade, and to secure our own. Proper Care also was taken to equip a greater Force, that when it became absolutely necessary to exert ourselves in a higher Degree, we might be able to do it, without any Apprehensions, let the State of *Europe* be what it would. And though it be true, that our Designs were in some Measure frustrated by the Intervention of Providence; yet it is as true, that we have prevented the Designs of our concealed Enemies, by the wise Measures which have been since pursued by our Administration, and are still able to carry into Execution all that a cool Resentment can dictate.

There is a mighty Difference between the Notions entertained by private Men of the proper Management of a War, and those that must be entertained by a Ministry who

who know what they are doing, must be accountable for what they do. An angry Person, in his Closet, may draw up Projects for invading this Place, and bombarding that. A Merchant, who has unfortunately lost a Ship, may resolve the whole Conduct of the War into guarding against Privateers; and a romantic Admirer of settling the Balance of Power, may be for laying Trains, and springing Mines in all Parts of *Europe*, that the Flame of War may become general. It costs these People Nothing, let what will become of their Schemes; but it is quite otherwise with the Ministry, their Fame and their Fortune, their publick and their private Characters, all they can hold dear or sacred, is at Stake; and we must not only believe them the worst, but the weakest of Men, if, in such a Situation, they act precipitately, or even without the utmost Circumspection.

That the Management of the present War is a Point not hastily to be decided on, may appear from hence; that there can be nothing more distant than the Judgments framed of it at home and abroad. Your Friends, who never think the Ministry in the right in any thing they do, exclaim against it as manifestly wrong, as carried on with much Coldness and Indifference.

ference. They say, that we have had needless Embargoes; that due Care has not been taken to protect our Merchants Ships; and that notwithstanding our great Fleets, the *Spaniards* have not been much distressed; besides a thousand other invidious Stories, which have been invented and trumpeted about with equal Malice, merely to alarm the Credulous, and inflame the Vulgar.

On the other hand, foreign Princes and States have considered our Conduct in quite another Light, and though they see that our Projects were lately disconcerted by the Winds, yet they see also, with Amazement mixed with Terror, that we have still such a Force on foot, as is sufficient to execute the great Designs that have been formed, in Spight of any Opposition we may meet with. At home some People talk of declining Commerce, and of Trade every Day decaying; but abroad, we are not only admitted to be the greatest Traders in the World, but are supposed to be grasping at the whole Trade of the *West-Indies*. In other Cases, Strangers are allowed to be the best Judges between contending Parties; but in this, the Malecontents will never allow it: They must believe all the World to be blind, or they must confess themselves to be so.

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I might add, to what I have already said, some Remarks on the wild Behaviour of our Patriots, with Respect to Admiral *Vernon*, whom they will divide from the Ministry, merely because he has done his Duty. He declar'd, when he was before *Carthagera*, that he had Orders to reduce that Place : From whom had he those Orders ; from a Ministry not in earnest ? Can there be any Thing in Nature more absurd, than to cry up a Man to the Skies for obeying Command, and at the same Time damning to the Pit of Hell those who command him. When Admiral *Norris* embark'd, the Patriots claimed him too ; but after the Accident that happened to the *Victory*, they relinquish'd him : and thus no doubt it will be, through the whole Course of the War. But, can you expect, Sir, that when the People of *Britain* recover themselves, and think freely, they will continue to receive such Absurdities for Articles of Faith ; if you do, you must be very sanguine indeed, and you must allow that Prejudice to Power is not inferior even to Enthusiasm itself.

But to come to the main Point, the War we are engaged in affects, in a very different Manner, the honest well-meaning People of *Great Britain*, and the Faction headed by your Friends, which I allow to be

numerous, but not so numerous as they are noisy. The People of *Britain*, in general, have their Trade, their Safety, and their Reputation at Stake ; they pay the Taxes, which must support this War, and they are strongly interested in it's Event. It is therefore natural for them to desire it may be carried on in such a Manner, as that it may be quickly ended, and a safe and lasting Peace succeed. But, it is quite otherwise with the Malecontents ; they consider the War in no other Light, than as it favours their Designs ; and will esteem it successful, not in Proportion to the Advantages we gain, or the Mischief done our Enemies ; but, as it lessens the Interest of the Ministry, and promotes their own ; and therefore, we are never to expect that these Men should be pleased with the Manner in which it is carried on, because all they aim at is to carry it on themselves.

We had various Specimens of this froward Humour in the last Session of Parliament, sufficient to open the Eyes of all who were inclined to see ; but you know, there are some blinder than the Blind, and they no doubt will still go on in the same Way ; that is, they will cry aloud for vigorous Measures, and yet find some Pretence or other, for opposing every vigorous Measure that is taken ;

taken ; as in the Case of the *Marines*. They will put the worst Constructions possible, whenever we do not meet with Success; and where we are successful, they will ascribe it to the Commanders, and yet charge it on the Ministry as a Crime, that better Measures were not taken, even for obtaining such Success. This you know was done in the famous Motion as to the taking *Porto-Bello*, which, after a vast Expence of Eloquence, was given up, as not reconcileable either to Sense or Grammar. They will except to the Expence of the War, though there is no War we can so easily bear, as a Naval one, however expensive. In short, they will exert their utmost Skill, in order to make the War as useful to them as they can ; and if after all they fail in this, they will turn their Tone, and accuse the Ministry of being no Lovers of Peace, as the *French* have already done in their *Manifesto*.

The modern Practice of preferring Debates to Consultations, destroys in a great Measure the excellent Intention of our most august Assemblies, and serves too frequently, to resolve sage Advice into fruitless Discourse. This in time becomes the Fate of every Science, as well as Politicks; and, in it's Turn, hath affected all free Governments, as well as ours. As the Reputation of any
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Branch of Knowledge increases, the Number of those, who would distinguish themselves therein, increases likewise; and this begets Questions, Arguments, and Disputes, which all tend, rather to improve the Art of Controversy, than that Art to which they are more immediately thought to relate. In *Greece*, in *Carthage*, and in *Italy*, the Age of Orators was always an Age of Confusion; and indeed, it will ever be so, where great Attention is paid to florid Discourses; there being nothing in Nature which hinders a Man of foul Principles from becoming a fine Speaker.

The present State of our Affairs, and especially the present State of the War, requires another Sort of Conduct, in order to bring it to a prosperous Issue; I mean an Issue prosperous to the Nation in general, those who bear the Expences of the Government, and to whom, as we are free, the Government itself is accountable. Disputes and Cavils at this Time of Day can only tend to produce Mistakes, if there has been none, and to render their Consequences more fatal, if there has. This may be pleasing to a Party, who delight in nothing so much as hitting Blots, and may be serviceable to such as aim at making a Change in the Ministry; but, as I shall hereafter show, this must
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at present be extremely prejudicial to the public Interest, and cannot possibly produce any future Advantages. The only Measure that can be of use to us in this nice Conjunction is Unanimity, and a hearty Desire, in all Parties, to serve their Country first, by doing whatever shall be expedient to bring this War to a happy Conclusion ; and then serve themselves, by enquiring into Mistakes and Mismanagements. We shall always be Masters at home ; the Point now under our Care is not to be mastered abroad.

I know very well that the general Opinion is, the *Spaniards* have no Capacity of contending with us, but that we might have crushed them long ago, if we had really intended so to do: Perhaps it may be so, but Ministers ought always to consider Consequences. The avowed parliamentary Design of this War, was not the utter Destruction of our Enemies, but the Reparation of ourselves; which I conceive will not be much facilitated by the Ruin of those who are to repair us.

The present System of Affairs in *Europe* is certainly not so favourable to us as we could wish ; though we have but one declared Enemy, we have several secret ones ; and amongst many Allies, we have few, who either can, or are inclined to act like
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Friends to us in this Dispute. The late Peace between the Emperor and *France* was projected at *Rome*, and was intended as the Basis of a Catholick Alliance. It has served therefore as one of the great Motives to *Spain* to act as she has done, from a Perswasion that she should easily find Friends, whereas it would be difficult for us to do so. The *French* and *Dutch* are deeply interested in the Trade of the *Spanish West-Indies*; and it is scarce to be expected, that either of these Nations should sacrifice her own Interest, or what she takes to be her own Interest, to ours. In the North we have one firm Ally, and, but for the Hand of Providence, we should by this Time have had another. This I take to be a clear and concise State of Things, I am sure it is a very impartial one; for as I take the best Care I can, not to be imposed on myself, so I have no View, no Desire, to impose upon others.

There are some amongst us, who have taken a great deal of Pains to exaggerate these Things, and to charge all the Inconveniencies that press us, either at home, or abroad, upon the Administration; nay, upon a single Person in the Administration, who, they say, has blunder'd us into them by his Negotiations. But sure, a Man must
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want common Sense, who, on the flightest Review, cannot discern this to be a gross and absurd Calumny. Is he chargeable with that warm Spirit of Catholick Piety, which reigns in the three great Courts of *Europe*? Is he chargeable with that clashing in a trading Interest, which hinders our natural Allies from seeing, with that Satisfaction they otherwise would do, our Capacity and Inclination to right ourselves in the *West-Indies*? Is he chargeable with the long Continuance of cross Winds, and crosser Accidents, which occasion'd new Difficulties no human Understanding could foresee; or if they had been revealed to him, could not possibly have been by him prevented? In a Word, is he chargeable with the Source of all these Mischiefs, the Notions *Geraldino* conceived of our domestick Dissensions, and which, with the Assistance of some who might be named, he impressed on the Minds of the principal Ministers at the Court of *Madrid*? No, certainly, these are Things for which he is not accountable. But one Thing is his Due, and ought for ever to be remembered of him, that we have at this Instant at Sea, Fleets sufficient to execute several great, substantial Designs, notwithstanding so many unlooked-for Accidents, maugre all the Clamour of our Male-contents at home,

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and notwithstanding all the Fraud and Force of our artificial Enemies abroad. But I am entering into Matters not so proper for the Letter of a private Man, his Defence will always suffer in any Language but his own, strong as his Reason, and clear as his Innocence.

The Situation we are now in renders it evident, that it will depend upon the Conclusion of this War, whether we shall be the first, or the last Nation in *Europe*, whether we shall be considered as a grave, steady, and magnanimous, or as a fickle, factious, and restless People. If we carry the great Point we contend for, of fixing our Navigation in the *West-Indies*, beyond the reach of future Cavils and Disputes; and if in the Course of the War, our Subjects in those Parts, reap extraordinary Advantages in Trade; and, in consequence of our military Operations, it will be allowed that all is done that could be humanly expected, and in succeeding Times the Terror of the *British* Naval Force will be much greater than ever: *Britain* may then be truly stiled Empress of the Ocean, for we shall then have given Laws to our Enemies in the Sight of all *Europe*, and this notwithstanding the Arts that have been used to construe general Treaties of Peace into Guarantees

tantees for lawless Depredations. We shall have done all this coolly and resolutely, without asking the Aid, or fearing the Resentment of any other Power, and at a Time when our Enemies would have persuaded the World, we were in no Condition to perform the least of these great Things.

But, in order to exert ourselves thus gloriously abroad, there must be Peace, there must be Tranquillity, at home; Faction must suspend it's Rage, and, if it be possible, Envy should cease to hiss; but, at least, there ought to be Quiet in the State, and Unity in our Councils. He who promotes these is a Friend to the Arms of *Great Britain*, and he who does not is a Friend to the *Spaniards*, whatever violent Things he may think fit to say against them; for it is well known we have but too many *Sempronii* amongst us. I am very sensible that some will call this Sort of Reasoning, pleading for Time, and endeavouring to sooth the Passions of the People: But, in Truth, Sir, I have no View but the great one, of endeavouring to convince some Folks of their Mistakes, and thereby serving my Country in general. In order to convince you of this, permit me to shew you how far, even on the Principles of your Friends, my Pro-

posaf must appear reasonable: For they must be strange Men indeed who will neither be made sensible by their Opponent's Arguments, nor be brought to consider impartially the Force and Weight of their own. This would be a political Obstinacy so shameful, that I cannot suspect it in *Englishmen*, and therefore I confess I do not proceed altogether without Hopes.

If Disputes about the Place-Bill, and tedious Enquiries into other Matters, should break in upon the Councils, which ought to intend the Management of the present War. If these or other such like Controversies should sowre the Minds, and turn the Heads of the People, so as to divert them from the great Point they ought to have in View. If instead of Loyalty, Industry, and Application, Jealousy, Sedition, and a factious Humour of Parliamentering, should be preached up, the natural Consequence will be, that our martial Spirit will evaporate, our open Enemies will take Heart, our concealed ones renew their Intrigues; and in such a Situation, what can become of the War in the Hands of any Minister whatever. Self Preservation is the first Law of Nature, and a Law that cannot be dispensed with; in such a Case the Administration must certainly look to itself, and as they are but Men, I do not see how
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we can expect they should with equal Success defend themselves against their personal Enemies at Home, and triumph over the Enemies of the Publick abroad. Such a Thing may be possible, but I think it would scarce be prudent, even in the Male-Contents, to run the Hazard; for if the Administration should succeed, theirs would be a lost Game, the Opposition would be for ever demolished, and *B——ke* himself might turn loyal.

On the other Hand, should we turn the Tables, and suppose that in Consequence of Place-Bills, Riots, Complaints about Privateers, and twenty other such Expedients, a Change in the Ministry could be brought about. Can you, Sir, or can any Man believe, that the War will go on the better for it? Is there any Instance in History that can be produced to favour such an Opinion, or the Shadow of an Argument capable of supplying the Want of Experience? If you suppose that the new Ministry would pursue the same Designs with the old, this is supposing, in other Words, that no Change is necessary; but if you believe, as I dare say you do, that they would act entirely on Plans of their own, then Nothing but Confusion could ensue from such sudden and thorough Alterations. New Schemes would naturally require new Officers, new Officers would want the Lights
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and Experience of their Predecessors, many Interruptions would all this occasion, and without the Interposition of Miracles, the most sanguine Malecontent in the Kingdom could scarce hope any Good from such a Management of the War. I am confident, if you reflect a Moment, you will own that I have handled the Pencil tenderly, and not painted this Scene near so strongly as I might have done; to tell you the Truth I was afraid of frightening my Readers, and that is rather the Province of your Friends than mine.

If therefore, as all Parties agree, this War is of such high Importance; if, as I have already proved, nothing short of universal Harmony can contribute to it's happy Conclusion; sure all true Patriots, all who prefer the thing to the Name, and are fond rather of serving their Country, than of speaking for it, will concur in promoting such an Union as they are convinced is necessary. To act otherwise is to act rather like an Incendiary than a Patriot, and he who at such a Time as this stirs the Coals of Sedition, and prompts his weaker, though well-meaning, Neighbours to disturb the Peace of their Country, while they vainly fancy they are doing it Service, shews himself more a *Spaniard* than a *Briton*, if we judge of Men as we ought to do, by their Deeds rather than by their Words.

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Such a Man may talk of Influence, and rail at Corruption, but it will be plain that he has the Seeds of both lurking in his Heart, and every true Judge of Mankind will not hesitate to declare that he is influenced by his Prejudices, and corrupted by his Expectations.

With great Concern I speak it, there is more of Corruption amongst your Friends, the pretended Patriots, than I have ever observed amongst any Ministry, or their Dependants, since I can remember. To say the Truth, that Coalition of Parties, of which you boast so much, is in itself the grossest, and vilest Corruption; it is a Term made Use of to signify those fallacious Arts, those fraudulent Contrivances, by which a few of your Chiefs have drawn a large Body of People of different Sentiments to concur in promoting their Designs. I know you, Sir, to be too penetrating a Person not to discern the Truth of what I say. You cannot but know that the Jacobites are told one Thing, the discontented Whigs another, and the Dissenters a third, while at the bottom, you design to serve them all alike; that is to serve yourselves at their Expence. Is this acting like Patriots, is this treating them like *Britons*, or can Men who act in this Manner talk of Influence and Corruption without feeling a Blush in their Cheeks? If they can, I am
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sure they are much lost to Shame, and nothing but repeated Disappointments, which I believe they are in a fair Way of meeting, will reclaim them.

The Trust reposed in you as a Member of Parliament is a very great one, it is the greatest Trust that can be reposed in a Freeborn Briton; I wish you may always remember this, and never have any other Biass in the Discharge of it, than the Remembrance of the Honour your Country has done you, in making Choice of you for its Representative. But consider, Sir, if this be so great, so weighty, so important an Office, it must require Thought and Attention in the Performance of it. It is not going the Lengths of a Party, it is not joining with those who proclaim themselves Patriots, it is not railing at Ministers, or refusing Places from the Crown, that simply and alone makes a Man a good Member: But it is a Disposition to consider the publick Affairs candidly, to abhor Prejudice as much as a Pension, and to have an equal Detestation of a groundless Opposition to, as for a slavish Dependance on a Court. These, Sir, are the Qualifications of a true Patriot, of such a one as approves himself to his own Conscience, and to the judging few, who despises this Character from
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the Rabble, because he knows them to be incompetent Judges.

Alcibiades among the *Athenians*, and *Marius* among the *Romans*, were popular for a Time, and Tyrants in Right of their Popularity. But *Phocion* and *Cato* the younger, who were truly Patriots, cared very little for the Applause of the People, though no Men of their Time, cared so much for their Safety. It has been the same Thing with our *English* Patriots; those who have studied to be thought so, seldom proved such in reality, and those who actually came up to the Character never had the Vanity to assume it. It is a good Observation of Lord *Clarendon*, that when Mr *Pym* went all the Lengths of Popularity, he was heard with Attention and Applause; but when he would have acted the Patriot indeed, when he would have poured Wine and Oil into the Wounds of his bleeding Country, then his Eloquence would do little; he had a Power of doing Mischief, but none of doing good. The best Patriot our History records is Sir *William Temple*, and he was a Courtier and a Minister, so long as in those Capacities he could serve his Country; moderate in his Sentiments, grave in his Language, he never spoke but to recommend Peace, and never acted but in hopes of contributing to it; he was loyal to his Master, and

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at the same Time faithful to his Country, he made no Distinction between their Service, and he had an ill Opinion of all who did. Forgive me, Sir, placing these Pictures in your Sight ; but believe me, Sir, they are as well worth your contemplating, as those of *Sejanus* or *Wolfey*, Sir *E. S.* or Sir *W. W.* After looking so long on falling Ministers and famous Speakers, it will do you no hurt, if you turn your Eyes on Pieces of a milder Kind. Once more I ask your Pardon for this Digression, that I may return to, and conclude, the Subject on which I have adventured to write.

The coming Session, it is said, will be a very busy one, and so in the Nature of things it must be ; but I perswade myself that all honest and thinking *Englishmen* desire that Business may be done rather than talked of ; there are many Matters of great Moment, which we have Reason to wish may be dispatched, and it will give us just Cause of Concern, should any of them be postponed for the Sake of gratifying the Lovers of Novelty and Noise ; Men who are least satisfied in Times of domestick Peace, and who place all their Pleasure in creating and viewing Disturbances. The Approach of Parliament is, and ought always to be, pleasant to a free People, it is a Time wherein they have an
 Opportunity

Opportunity of declaring their Grievances, and of obtaining Redress, wherein new Laws may be demanded where old ones are insufficient, and where Application may be made for abating the Edge of such as are found too severe. Reflect then, Sir, on the just Character of those, who, as far as in their Power lies, attempt to deprive us of these Blessings, by diverting a great Part of that Time which is due to the Business of the Nation, to Party-Squabbles; weigh with yourself the Iniquity of imposing on the common People, by dressing up pompous Proposals, which at the Bottom mean nothing but to raise a Cry, and to invite a Multitude; remember how unfit a Season this is for the Practice of such Arts; when so many Things in our domestic OEconomy claim our Attention, and we are engaged in a foreign War of such mighty Consequence. Add to all this the broken and unsettled State of *Europe*, the prodigious Strides our ambitious Neighbour has made of late Years, partly through her Union at Home, and partly through our Dissensions. These are Prospects which ought to render us serious, which ought to render us sincere; let us then forget all factious Heat, and let us in our several Stations feel no other Biass, than that which is derived to us from our Affection to our Country,

Country, and the common Cause of Protestants.

These, Sir, are no Instructions sent either to awe or to prove you; they are the Sentiments of a private Person, who from Respect to you, and out of Zeal to the Publick Service, thought it his Duty to lay them before you in this Manner; it remains with you to receive them as you think fit, but of this be assured, that amongst the most noisy of your Admirers, there is not one who is more truly, or with greater Affection,

S I R,

Your obedient humble Servant,



